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INTRODUCTION 
Health reform has been a constant dispute on US political battlefield during 
the past decades. The two main problems that have been echoing again and again are 
cost and coverage. On the one hand, by 2007 the US expense on health care was a 
16.2% of GDP1, which considered on a per capita basis, was more than two times the 
median spending of  a country of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), while the quality of care was average or even below2. On the 
other hand, by 2008 the number of people without health coverage was estimated that 
reached the 45.7 million3, which raised great concerns.  
In this context, the need of a Health Reform was finally put at the center of the 
2008 presidential campaign. With the victory of President Obama, his proposal for a 
broad reform of the US healthcare system was eventually approved, though after 
some hard bargaining. Despite some initial success among the insurers, last year 
(2016) an important number of them declared that they would withdraw from the 
Marketplaces that the reform had provided, where they offered regulated and 
subsidised health coverage.  
Therefore, the aim of this work is to understand the mechanisms that rule the 
health reform, commonly known as Obamacare; as well as to try to figure out why 
the insurance companies are leaving the Marketplaces. In order to do so, this 
dissertation starts with a general economic introduction to the Health Care Industry 
and how it would work in a free market, in Chapter 1. Then it proceeds in Chapter 2 
with a legal introduction to the Health Reform, and the legal challenges that it had to 
overtake at the US Supreme Court. Chapter 3 focuses on the economic elements of 
Obamacare, and Chapter 4 tries to understand these elements by means of some 
practical research through the Marketplaces. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis 
and tries to answer some important questions based on the results of the research. 
                                                          
1 Fernandez, Bernadette (Coordinator), “Health Care Reform: An Introduction”, US Congressional 
Research Service, August 31st 2009. Page 4.  
2 Idem, page 1. 
3 Idem, page 2. 
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1 THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY IN A FREE MARKET 
Introduction 
First of all, it is important to analyse how the insurance industry works from 
an economic point of view. In this sense, an insurance company is a business that 
works as a collective pool of money to which all its customers contribute periodically, 
and in exchange they get financial protection (known as coverage) whenever they 
need to get medical services. In order to keep the business running, insurers 
instinctively charge a higher contribution (the so-called premium) to the customers 
who are expected to need a major coverage –that is to say, the unhealthy. This policy 
is economically sensible –though not usually socially sensitive-, as the ones who are 
due to extract more from the pool are the ones who have to provide more money to it 
in the first place. Therefore, prior to providing any insurance, the insurer computes 
the chances that a potential customer will need to receive health care, in order to 
estimate the proper amount of the premium to charge. 
But this theoretical mechanism has some important problems when put into 
practice. Social concerns apart, the two main obstacles are the phenomena of moral 
hazard and adverse selection –the latter eventually leading, in the worst scenario, to a 
death spiral.  
The concept of risk 
Before proceeding to their explanation, the concept of risk should be clarified. 
The general definition of risk is “the possibility of something bad happening”4, so in 
the insurance industry, the risk is essentially the possibility that a customer may use 
the health care coverage –as it means a subtraction of money from the common pool. 
Following this logic, a low risk individual is somebody who looks healthier and 
presumably will not make much use of their coverage, while a high risk individual is 
                                                          
4 Cambridge Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
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somebody who is apparently unhealthy –or even obviously so, due to known pre-
conditions in their medical records, or because of their advanced age-, and 
consequently is more likely to ask for coverage. It should be noted that the notion of 
risk is always used in reference to a future-to-be, and therefore there is no certainty 
about whether a low/high risk individual may use little or major coverage. 
1.1 MORAL HAZARD 
Regarding the aforementioned problems that insurers encounter when 
implementing their health plans, the first one is a natural behaviour of any individual, 
whichever their level of risk. As a matter of fact, there are two types of moral hazard5, 
depending on whether the risk profile of an individual changes before using the 
medical coverage (ex-ante moral hazard) or whether the individual is more inclined 
to use more coverage after needing it (ex-post moral hazard), but without changing 
its risk profile. 
Ex-ante moral hazard 
According to the ex-ante moral hazard, a person who is insured is more 
inclined to take greater risks than an uninsured person because they know that they 
have medical coverage. The rationale behind this instinctive behaviour is that, as 
people do not suffer from the results of their decisions –at least economically-, they 
increase the risks they take. As a result, the risk profile of a person is likely to 
increase once they buy insurance, taking a more risky way of life, and consequently 
raise the odds of needing coverage. This concept can be illustrated with the example 
of a beginner skier, who without coverage would not take risks and would go down 
the easy slopes, being thus labelled as a low risk person. However, if this very same 
                                                          
5  STANCIOLE, Anderson E., “Health Insurance and Lifestyle Choices: Identifying Ex Ante Moral 
Hazard in the US Market”, The Geneva Papers, Nº 33, pages 627-644. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. 
Pages 627 and 628. 
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person has full coverage in case of accident, they are more likely to take the risk to 
ski down harder slopes, hence changing its profile to a higher risk person than before6. 
Ex-post moral hazard 
On the other hand, ex-post moral hazard does not imply a change in the risk 
propensity of the individual, but a change in their inclination to use a medical service 
in case they need it. The logic behind this type of moral hazard is the very simple 
economic law of supply and demand: if the use of medical services is cheaper 
(because of the insurance coverage), then the demand for it will be higher. 
Consequently, an insured individual of any risk profile, and without changing its risk 
propensity, may be more likely to benefit from their medical coverage for any little 
trifle such as a simple headache, whereas they would not resort to it if they were not 
insured. This behaviour leads to a more intensive use of medical services by the 
insured customers, compared with the services they would use if uninsured. 
Continuing with the previous example, an insured low risk person may ski down an 
easy slope and fall, luckily without any apparent injuries. If they were insured, they 
may make use of the coverage in order to check whether there are any imperceptible 
but serious damages underneath. Contrarily, if they are uninsured and they do not 
perceive any pain, they are likely to abstain from doing any further checking. 
How to avoid moral hazard: cost-sharing schemes 
The existence of moral hazard is undoubtedly counterproductive for insurers, 
as customers tend to claim more coverage than the one they bargained for. That is 
why the insurance companies have devised some mechanisms to lower the impact of 
moral hazard. The most common approach is the establishment of cost-sharing 
schemes, such as co-payment, deductibles, and co-insurance. The essential idea 
behind these tools is that a part of the costs of the coverage is assumed by the 
                                                          
6 As STANCIOLE points out, this theoretical behaviour is softened when applied in practice, because 
besides the economic factor, individuals also take into account the potential pain and suffering they 
may experience following a riskier and unhealthier lifestyle.  
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customer. In the co-payment, the insured pays a prearranged fixed price each time 
they receive a medical service, so that the more the insured uses their insurance’s 
services, the more they have to co-pay. Hence, any individual will think twice before 
using their insurance. In the same way, the deductibles is an amount of money the 
insured has to pay out of their own pocket before getting coverage from the insurance, 
and the coinsurance is a percentage of the costs of a health care service that the 
insured has to pay, the remnant being covered by the insurance.  
These cost-sharing schemes help to palliate the effects of both ex-ante and ex-
post moral hazard. As regards ex-ante moral hazard, the fact that the insured has to 
contribute to the costs of its coverage means that now they have to partake at least in 
a part of the consequences of their actions. Therefore, they will act more carefully 
and their risk is less likely to change. In other words, the beginner skier will prefer to 
keep going down the easy slopes, in order to avoid having to pay for an important 
part of the cost of a rescue service and its subsequent medical assistance. Actually, 
the greater is the part of the costs that the customer has to share, the most likely they 
will remain in their level of risk. 
Concerning the ex-post moral hazard, the reasoning is quite similar. The 
customer, regardless of their risk profile, will try to use the medical services only 
when necessary, as they will ponder in each case whether it is avoidable or not to 
retort to the coverage, considering the share they have in it. In this case, the skier who 
fell going down the easy slope will consider the circumstances of the accident and the 
gravity of the crash before deciding whether it is necessary to spend the part they 
have to assume from the coverage. Consequently, the intensity on the use of the 
coverage will be inversely proportional to the extent of the share that the customer 
has to undertake. 
For example, if we consider an insurance plan where there is a deductible of 
$1,000, as well as a subsequent coinsurance of 20% of the expenses until $2,000, up 
from which the insured customer need not assume any further cost (capped payment). 
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As can be seen in Figure 1, this cost-sharing scheme is designed in order to avoid 
moral hazard for routine medical services, as any small expense is paid out of the 
insured’s pocket. However, if the medical coverage is of significance costs, such as 
an accident or an important illness, then the customer is relieved from any further 
expenditure above the $1,200. 
 
Figure 1. Cost-Sharing Example 
1.2 ADVERSE SELECTION AND DEATH SPIRAL 
Adverse selection 
In the theoretical scheme introduced above, the essential principle was that 
low risk individuals should pay less than high risk individuals. In order to implement 
it successfully, it is fundamental that the insurer knows exactly the state of health of 
each of its customers. But in real life, this premise is impracticable; on the contrary, 
there is asymmetry of information, as customers usually are better informed about 
their health than insurers are. The result is what is known as adverse selection: the 
person who is better informed (the insured) can choose a product which they value 
more than its real price (a relatively cheap insurance, in relation to their risk), because 
the other trading partner (the insurer) does not know that they would (and should) pay 
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more for it. Thus, the customer can make a selection that is adverse to the insurer –
that is, it has a negative effect on the insurer’s business. 
Diversity of menus on offer 
In order to control adverse selection, insurers diversify their offer of insurance, 
creating various menus with different premiums and different ranges of coverage and 
co-payment schemes. The diversity of plan options implies that costumers have to 
choose whether to have more or less advantages, depending on the price. Thus, low 
risk individuals will apply for the cheaper, less assorted plans, and consequently they 
will not be so prone to taking more risk –especially if such risk is out of coverage. 
Besides, the cheap plans have more expenses derived from cost-sharing payments, 
which in turn affects the intensity of healthcare use by their customers. As a result, 
the low-cost plans attract low risk individuals who want coverage against the worst-
case scenarios, and in contrast do not mind paying for most of the routine care from 
their own pocket. 
The diversity of menus is a thoroughly useful tool, as it distributes each 
individual to the coverage that is more appropriate to their risk profile. What is more 
interesting is that this classification of customers is made by the individuals 
themselves, as it is the purchaser the one who chooses the plan. In other words, the 
menus are an indirect solution to the adverse selection, as the insurer does not force 
the choice of the customer.  
Market differentiation 
Another way of curbing adverse selection is to set premiums according to 
market differentiation. That is to say, to classify the market population in different 
groups, taking into account various variables, such as age, tobacco use, or family and 
personal background. Then, insurers estimate the average risk of each group, with the 
help of some statistics –or simply by randomly selecting one person from the group. 
And finally, they set a premium for each group based on their average risk. In this 
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sense, the more variables the insurers use –and therefore, the more they differentiate 
the market-, the better, as there will be less variations from the average risk. As a 
matter of fact, Obamacare limits considerably the scope for market differentiation, as 
it establishes that premiums can vary only according to age and tobacco use –and it 
even sets maximum ratios for the premium increases. 
However, the threat of adverse selection is still present: those individuals who 
know that they have a higher risk than the average of their group will be attracted to 
buy the insurance, as they will value the insurance above the premium price –that is, 
they will find the premium cheap. Conversely, those who have a below-average risk 
will not be interested in buying the insurance, as they will value the insurance below 
the premium price –i.e. they will think the premium is too expensive. Following this 
reasoning, each policy is very likely to have more people with an above-average risk 
than people with a below-average risk. Consequently, the pool of money is in danger 
of running out of money, as the input money provided by the premiums can be less 
than the output money dispensed for the customers’ coverage. 
The death spiral 
The instinctive reaction of the insurers is to raise premiums, but then the same 
situation develops again –though worsened, as a major number of individuals find the 
new pricier premium too expensive and get out of the insurance. Only those with a 
higher risk value the insurance above its price and are interested in remaining insured, 
which implies that once more, the pool of money is prone to be emptied much 
quicker than it is filled. And that is how the adverse selection eventually leads to a 
death spiral: a vicious cycle where insurers increase premiums to cope with the 
higher amount of sicker customers, which feeds back into the healthier ones leaving 
the insurance, forcing the insurers to raise prices again. 
Another common response to adverse selection is to not let people with higher 
risk into the pool –that is to say, to not let sicker people buy insurance, based on their 
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pre-existing medical conditions. Thus the death spiral is averted, though in an 
ethically questionable way. 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
All this approach to the health insurance industry is based on the rules of a 
free market, where there is no interference of State regulations. In this scenario, 
insurers can retort to different mechanisms, which can be reduced to three 
alternatives: to raise premiums, to lower coverage or to choose clients.  
As already seen, raising premiums is the more immediate response in order to 
keep the pool with enough money to cope with the coverage costs, but it has the 
drawback of entering into the vicious cycle of a death spiral. That is why this tool is 
accompanied by a differentiation of various menus, where the cheapest have less 
coverage and more cost-sharing policies. Thus, the insurance company can attract 
healthier people, concerned about being insured especially in case of important 
accidents or sicknesses. Conversely, the other tool is focused to the other group of 
customers: those who are sicker may have to pay much more, or may even be 
expelled from the insurance. 
However, the government wants to alleviate some of these drastic measures, 
and in order to do so it uses some countermeasures. Thus, it avoids high raises on 
premiums regulating the market prices; it averts the lessening of coverage by 
requiring generous minimums by law; and it can even forbid insurers to expel clients 
based on their health preconditions. These are precisely some of the steps followed by 
the Obamacare, whose aim is to correct the inefficiencies of the healthcare market but, 
at the same time, introduce some policies designed to correct some social differences. 
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2 LEGAL APPROACH TO OBAMACARE: APPROVAL 
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 
2.1 APPROVAL OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 
The reform of the US healthcare system was brought again at the front page of 
the political debate up from 2008, especially thanks to Obama’s campaign for the 
presidency. As a matter of fact, health reform was one of the central aims of his 
platform. His proposal, though watered down through the subsequent Congressional 
debate, would finally enforce a few important principles that have been henceforth 
fundamental, namely: the individual mandate, the Medicaid expansion and its 
subsidies, and the requirement to companies to accept all customers. The essential 
idea behind these bases is that if healthy individuals are compelled to get insured 
(individual mandate), then the insurance companies can pool the risk of healthier and 
sicker people together, and offer a more affordable price for all of them. This way, 
together with the expansion of subsidies and Medicaid coverage for the poorer, and 
the obligation for insurers to accept applications -regardless of their preconditions-, 
the result should be an increase of coverage and a decrease in costs. 
But such a reform plan encountered a fierce opposition from the Republican 
Party, as the costs of its implementation were at odds with its principle of small 
government. The main concern was about the supposed unconstitutionality of the 
individual mandate, which afterwards would be brought in front of the Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, there was political debate about two other itchy points, such as 
the establishment of a “public option” or the expansion of Medicare. The “public 
option” aim is to create a government-run health care plan that would work as an 
alternative to private ones -or even as a fallback, in case all other private insurers pull 
out. Due to its ambition, this idea was vehemently opposed by the Republicans, who 
would only cede to some limited degree of Medicaid expansion. That is because the 
Medicaid program is more reduced than the “public option”, as it focuses exclusively 
on children and adults with limited income and resources. 
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Approval procedure 
The legislative procedure that ended with the approval of the Affordable Care 
Act (from now on, ACA) has been a conjunction of luck, timing and arithmetic. 
Thanks to the favourable results of the 2008 elections, the Democrats gained the 
majority in both Chambers of Congress: 257 Democrats against 199 Republicans in 
the House of Representatives, and 57-41 in the Senate. Additionally, two 
independents caucused with the Democrats, so the support for the healthcare reform 
in the Senate was, by the opening of the new Congress, of 59-41. That meant that 
they were only missing one senator to reach the supermajority of 60 needed to avoid 
a filibuster, which is a parliamentary ruse that allows lawmakers to delay the vote on 
a proposed legislation by making time-consuming trivial speeches. Consequently, 
political arrangements were made and eventually, on April 28 2009, Pennsylvania 
Republican Senator Arlen Spector changed parties and gave Democrats the coveted 
60-40 supermajority.  
However, a few months later the Massachusetts Democrat Senator Ted 
Kennedy died, leaving at stake the 60th vote. As a Democrat interim senator was 
appointed until the special elections would take place, on January 19 2010, the 
Democrats rushed the health reform proposition through the Senate on December 24 
2009, where it won 60-40. The bill had already been approved by the House of 
Representatives on November 7, on a tight 220-215 vote (39 Democrats voted against 
it), though there it included the “public option”, whereas the one in the Senate didn’t. 
Following the victory of Republican Senator Scott Brown in Massachusetts, the 
Democrats decided to pass the Senate-approved bill through the House, in order to 
avoid any further delay. That’s how the final bill, without the “public option”, was 
approved by the House of Representatives on March 21 2010 –by a 219-212 vote, 
with 34 Democrats against–, and finally signed into law by President Obama on 
March 23.  
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The final outcome of all this political horse-trading has been the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) –commonly known as the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) or Obamacare. As previously explained, the final bill had to 
relinquish the “public option” and part of the Medicaid expansion, as well as 
guarantee some antiabortion measures, in order to gain a broader backing among the 
legislative. In this aspect, it was necessary for President Obama to sign the Executive 
Order 135357, barring Federal funding for abortion, in order to gain the adhesion of 
Democrat B. Stupak and 7 congressmen more. These votes would be essential for 
passing the bill by 219-212, on March 21 2010. All the same, it was only supported 
by Democrats –and even some Democrat Representatives voted against it-. That’s 
why it has been widely criticised for its lack of more broad and bipartisan consensus, 
as is usually the case in such important reforms. 
2.2 FIRST RULING: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS 
V. SEBELIUS (JUNE 28 2012) 
The first legal action against Obamacare was over the supposed 
unconstitutionality of the individual mandate. As a matter of fact, as soon as the law 
was approved, 13 States filed suit, joined afterwards by 13 more States, as well as the 
National Federation of Independent Business and four private individuals. Thus, 26 
of the 50 States that make up the USA were against the bill. Together with the issue 
regarding the individual mandate, the plaintiffs also objected the Medicaid expansion, 
as it was regarded as coercive for the States and exceeding the Federal Government’s 
authority. There were also 2 procedural plaints, thought incidental and not important 
for the current study (so they will be simply stated, but not explained): whether the 
case couldn’t be decided until the mandate would take effect, in 2015, and whether 
the rest of the law was supposed to be invalid if the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional.  
                                                          
7 The Executive Order can be consulted in the following link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/executive-order-patient-protection-and-affordable-care-acts-consistency-with-longst. 
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Individual mandate 
The individual mandate is a “requirement to maintain minimum essential 
coverage” that is established in Section 5000 of title 26 of the United States Code 
(hereinafter, USC). As its brief legal designation reveals, it consists of a mandate for 
any individual to be insured under a “minimum essential” health insurance coverage. 
Non-compliance with such obligation implies a penalty, called “shared responsibility 
payment” (26 USC §5000(b)). Actually, the amount of the fine depends on the 
coverage, the income of the individual and the size of their family, so it is based on 
the principle of proportionality. In this regard, there are some exemptions that take 
into account the individual’s household income (§5000(e)(1)) –though there are also 
some genuine American peculiarities among the exceptions, such as the members of 
Indian tribes, or the members of certain religious sects or divisions (§5000(d)(2)), 
presumably the result of political concessions to gain some conservative votes-. 
The Obama administration justified the individual mandate on the basis of the 
constitutional mandate for Congress “to regulate Commerce among the several States” 
(art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution of the United States), also known as the 
interstate commerce clause. Thus, their point was that, as the health care industry 
accounted for nearly 18% of USA’s GDP, Congress had the power to intervene in 
order to lower the cost of care. Subsidiary, the administration also claimed that the 
penalty accompanying the mandate had to be classified as a tax, and was accordingly 
included in the Congress’ constitutional right to tax (art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1 of the 
Constitution). On the other hand, the plaintiffs argued that the individual mandate 
was an excess of the Congress’ powers, as it was interfering in economic inactivity. 
Hence they contended that individuals couldn’t be forced to take action –that is, enrol 
into a health insurance plan-, in the scope of the commerce clause. The States also 
challenged the tax nature of the penalty, though without giving much importance to it. 
Actually, at first the very same Democrats had passed the bill insisting that the 
mandate was not a tax. 
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Finally, the Supreme Court sided in favour of the bill –with an important 
limitation, though. On June 28 2012, the court ruled8 , by 5 votes to 4, that the 
individual mandate was not based on the commerce clause, but on the right to tax. 
The defence’s main argument of regulating under the commerce clause was rejected 
because the court confirmed the plaintiff’s point that “the power to regulate 
commerce presupposes [indeed] the existence of commercial activity to be regulated” 
(opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, Supreme Court’s ruling of 28 June 2012, page 18).  
Conversely, the ruling unexpectedly upheld the backup argument of the 
Obama administration. Thus, the court confirmed that, taking into account the 
characteristics of the penalty, it could be legally identified as a tax. Among different 
considerations, it observed that its payment is included with the taxpayer’s annual 
return to the Federal Government, and that the Act states that the penalty must be 
assessed and collected in the same manner as a tax penalty (§5000(g)(1)). 
Furthermore, the concern about interference on non-activity was solved, because the 
US Constitution “protects us from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause so 
long as we abstain from the regulated activity. But […] the Constitution has made no 
such promise with respect to taxes” (opinion of the court, Supreme Court’s ruling of 
28 June 2012, page 42). Therefore, the court points out that the Constitution does not 
allow individuals to avoid taxes through inactivity, as many taxes are based on the 
mere existence of the individual (opinion of the court, idem, page 41). 
Although apparently a little nuance regarding the legal source that allows the 
individual mandate to be enforced, this difference is actually important. The 
consequence is a distinctive degree of control over individual behaviour. Thus, while 
the commerce clause would allow Congress to command individuals to do as it 
directs, punishing incompliance with criminal sanctions; the right to tax is more 
limited and simply permits Congress to require the payment to the Federal Treasury, 
but nothing more. 
                                                          
8 The Supreme Court’s June 28th 2012 ruling can be consulted in the following link: 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf. 
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Medicaid expansion 
The other grand issue was the expansion of Medicaid. The bill increased 
considerably the obligations of the States under Medicaid. Originally, the program 
was limited and covered only certain discrete categories of needy individuals –
pregnant, women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled-, 
and the States enjoyed significant flexibility in the way they applied such coverage. 
But ACA reformed and expanded State Medicaid programs. The main changes were 
the requirement for States to cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes 
below 133% of the federal poverty line, as well as the establishment of an “essential 
health benefits” package, available to all Medicaid recipients, which would guarantee 
the fulfilment of the individual mandate.  
However, the disagreement was not on the substance of the expansion, but on 
the way it was pursued, as it was deemed aggressive towards the States. Certainly, the 
health reform allowed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold all 
further payments to the States that didn’t comply with any Medicaid requirements –
the expansion ones included (United States Code title 42, section 1396 (c)). This 
provision implied that, in practice, Congress was threatening the States that did not 
comply with the Medicaid expansion with the withdrawal of all Medicaid federal 
funds. Despite affirming Congress’s authority to condition the payment of funds to 
the States with restrictions on the use of those funds, the court rules that in this case 
the conditions have exceeded this power and are unjustified. That is because these 
conditions are seen as “threats to terminate other significant independent grants” 
(opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, page50)–such as the funds that the States already received until the reform-, 
and are therefore perceived as means of pressure towards the States, for them to 
unwillingly accept the policy changes. 
As the same court points out, a middle ground could have been to let the 
States choose whether to join the expansion and therefore get additional payments, or 
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to forgo the expansion keeping the existing payments. But as the bill did not provide 
this option, and as the Supreme Court cannot rewrite the bill, the ruling simply states 
that the reform of USC 42, §1396c is unconstitutional, and does not propose the 
moderate solution just explained above, but merely states that no condition can be 
made based on Federal payments. 
2.3 SECOND RULING: KING V. BURWELL (25 JUNE 2015) 
The upholding of the individual mandate did not deter the opponents of the 
ACA, and soon afterwards came a second legal complaint in the Supreme Court. This 
time, the plaintiffs were 4 individuals from the State of Virginia, and their objection 
to the ACA was statutory –not constitutional-, though also of fundamental importance, 
as the own court asserted in its deliberation. The essential question brought up to the 
court was whether the tax credits granted by the ACA included individuals who 
bought insurance from a Federal Exchange, as the ACA explicitly established that 
individuals entitled to such tax credits had to be “enrolled in through an Exchange 
established by the State” (26 USC §36B(b)(2)). 
It must be clarified that the ACA provides the creation of Exchanges, which 
are health insurance marketplaces where individuals can compare and purchase 
insurance plans. These exchanges can be created by the States, or otherwise by the 
Federal Government if the State does not. On the other hand, the ACA establishes a 
series of refundable tax credits in order to subsidise the coverage to a wide number of 
individuals, depending on their income. Finally, it must be taken into account that the 
act provides a general exemption to the individual mandate, which applies when the 
cost of buying insurance exceeds 8% of an individual’s income. 
Considering the three elements above described (the types of exchanges, the 
tax credits and the exemptions), the 4 plaintiffs objected paradoxically that, as 
Virginia had a Federal Exchange, they should not be able to receive a tax credit. The 
explanation to their rejection was quite simple, though: if it were not for the tax credit, 
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they would be exempted of buying insurance, as its cost would be more than 8% of 
their income. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling was again favourable to the ACA, and this time 
the court was more concerned about the structure of the act and the interconnection 
between its elements, as well as the importance of health reform, and the important 
precedent of the Massachusetts own health reform of 2006. Thus, the court 
summarizes the three essential elements of Obamacare (which will be explained in 
more detail later): the individual mandate, the subsidies and the insurance market 
regulations –which include the prohibition of discriminatory premium rates and the 
prohibition of non-coverage based on preconditions-. As the own court explains, 
these three elements are intertwined and are crucial in order to avoid the main 
obstacle to the health reform: a death spiral.  
In this case, the Supreme Court rules that the ACA’s tax credits apply both in 
State and Federal Exchanges, because otherwise the intent of the act would be 
compromised. If citizens in Federal Exchanges were not eligible for subsidies, then 
insurance would be unaffordable for a growing number of people, which would 
prefer to pay the individual mandate’s penalty –or would even be exempted of it, as 
the plaintiffs’ case-. This would consequently lead to a rise in premiums, as only the 
sick would stay insured. This situation results in what is commonly known as a death 
spiral, and is what already had happened in Massachusetts before 2006, as Chief 
Justice Roberts explains: “as premiums rose higher and higher, and the number of 
people buying insurance sank lower and lower, insurers began to leave the market 
entirely” (opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, Supreme Court’s ruling of 25th June 2015, 
case King v. Burwell, page 6). Therefore, the court rejects the petitioners’ objection, 
as it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal 
Exchange, and likely create the very “death spirals” that Congress designed the Act 
to avoid” (opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, King v. Burwell, page 20). 
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3 ECONOMIC APPROACH TO OBAMACARE: 
THE THREE KEYS OF OBAMACARE 
The Affordable Care Act’s main concern is to grant an extensive coverage of 
health insurance in the United States, and at the same time avoid the development of 
a death spiral that may lead to the exit of the insurers from the marketplace. As 
already seen, a death spiral consists of a vicious circle in which increasing premiums 
in an insurance lead to decreasing buyers of this insurance, and eventually the insurer 
may disappear. In order to avert it, Obamacare is based on three pillars: a couple of 
market regulations (the community rating requirement and the open enrolment), the 
individual mandate and the subsidies. 
3.1 INSURANCE MARKET REGULATIONS 
In order to avoid a death spiral, the common solution among insurers is to not 
let sick people in, by surcharging them with much higher premiums. This way, 
insurers can keep premiums lower for healthier people, who may stay insured and 
thus help pool the risk and its costs. But Obamacare’s aim is to expand access to 
coverage for all citizens, regardless of their risk or sickness. In order to achieve such 
goal, the ACA sets two essential insurance market regulations: the prohibition of 
discriminatory premium rates –known as the community rating requirement-, and the 
prohibition of non-coverage based on preconditions –known as the guaranteed issue 
requirement, or more commonly, the open enrolment-.  
The community rating requirement is introduced by the modification of title 
42 USC, §300gg(a)(1)9, which regulates the factors that can affect premium rates. 
                                                          
9  “With respect to the premium rate charged by a health insurance issuer for health insurance 
coverage offered in the individual or small group market- 
(A) such rate shall vary with respect to the particular plan or coverage involved only by- 
(i) whether such plan or coverage covers an individual or family; 
(ii) rating area, as established in accordance with paragraph (2); 
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These factors can only be four: the number of individuals covered by the plan –in 
case of a family plan-, the rating area -established by the State-, the age of the 
individuals and their tobacco use. Consequently, insurers have discretion to alter 
premiums taking into account essentially three variables –location, age and tobacco 
use-; and the law even restricts the rate at which the premiums can diverge: less than 
3 to 1 for the age, and less than 1.5 to 1 for the tobacco use. 
Regarding the guaranteed issue requirement, the ACA also modifies title 42 
USC, §300-1(a), concerning availability of coverage. It provides that “each health 
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group 
market in a State must accept every employer and individual in the State that applies 
for such coverage”, subject to certain admissible restrictions relating to restricted 
enrolment periods, network plans and financial capacity limits, in which cases these 
restrictions must apply to all employers or individuals in the group or individual 
market in the State. This way, any denial of coverage based on preconditions 
concerning the medical history of any individual is forbidden. Together with the 
prohibition of discrimination of prices, these provisions try to force the insurers to let 
in individuals with a higher risk of sickness with no restrictions.  
Furthermore, Obamacare also regularises the price of the premiums, 
especially in relation to the cost-sharing scheme that they follow, which include 
mainly deductibles, co-payment, and coinsurance (as already seen above). As a result, 
when entering the exchanges individuals can choose between 4 main metal categories 
of plans (bronze, silver, gold and platinum), according to how is distributed the 
sharing of the health care costs. Thus, in the bronze category, customers must pay on 
average about 40% of the costs, while in the platinum category they usually pay on 
average 10% of the costs (see figure 2).  
                                                                                                                                                                     
(iii) age, except that such rate shall not vary by more than 3 to 1 for adults (consistent 
with section 300gg–6(c) of this title); and 
(iv) tobacco use, except that such rate shall not vary by more than 1.5 to 1; and 
(B) such rate shall not vary with respect to the particular plan or coverage involved by any other 
factor not described in subparagraph (A)”. 
OBAMACARE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES  GRASA ARROYO JOAN 
22 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated averages for a typical population.  
Source: US Federal Government healthcare website  
(https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plans-categories/)  
3.2 INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
Introduction 
Unfortunately, these insurance market regulations alone cannot accomplish 
the universal coverage purpose, as they lead to a death spiral anyway. The problem is 
that healthy people have no incentive to buy insurance until they get sick, and 
therefore the number of people with a below-average risk decreases. That leads to an 
inevitable dead spiral, as premiums rise and insured people decline.  
As noticed before in King v. Burwell, the first State to find a solution to this 
problem was Massachusetts, in 2006. Curiously enough, the popularly known as 
Romneycare was precisely a Republican proposal, which successfully added two new 
crucial elements to the mix: the individual mandate and the subsidies. That is how 
Obamacare, inspired by Romneycare, took the individual mandate into the federal 
level –which was then fiercely attacked by the Republican opposition-. Leaving 
political controversies aside, the essence of the mandate is to force healthy people 
into the insurance plans in order to compensate its costs. Together with both the 
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community rating and guaranteed issue requirements, as well as the subsidies, this 
new mechanism makes the plans affordable for any individual, especially the sick 
ones.  
The individual mandate is introduced by the modification of title 26 USC, 
§5000A(a), which establishes a “requirement to maintain a minimum essential 
coverage” (already explained above). Its payment is made when filing the federal tax 
return for the taxable year that the taxpayer does not have coverage. 
The shared responsibility payment 
In case of non-compliance with the mandate, the law provides a penalty or 
“shared responsibility payment” (hereinafter, the SRP), which consists of 1/12th of 
the annual SRP for each month that the individual does not have coverage and does 
not qualify for a coverage exemption –though there is a short gap for the first three 
consecutive months, in which the fine is not applicable, as will be seen below in the 
exemptions-. The annual amount of the SRP can be calculated10 in two different ways, 
either as a percentage of household income or as a flat dollar amount per person, 
being whichever is higher the one to pay as fine (26 USC §5000A(b) and (c)). 
On the one hand, the percentage of the household income is 2.5 % for 2016 
and subsequent years, and only applied on the income that is above the tax return 
filing threshold11. It must be taken into account that this percentage has progressively 
increased from 2014, when it was 1% -though the 2.5 percentage is the last legally 
provided raise, being from now on that fixed rate. On the other hand, the flat dollar 
amount is calculated on a family basis, adding $695 per adult and $347.50 per child 
                                                          
10  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which is US’ tax collection agency, provides an online 
interactive estimator where any individual can introduce its personal information anonymously, and 
get an estimation of the SRP they would have to pay: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/estimator/isrp/.  
11 The tax return filing threshold is the minimum amount of gross income an individual must make to 
be required to file a tax return, depending on their age and filing status (e.g. single, married, head of 
household, widow with dependent children, etc.). For example, the 2016 federal tax filing threshold of 
an under 65 is $10,350 if he/she is single or $20,700 if he/she is married and filing jointly.  For more 
information: https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/aca-individual-shared-
responsibility-provision-calculating-the-payment.  
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under 18, up to a maximum of $2,085 per household. Here there has also been an 
escalation of costs, as the law provided an amount of $95 and $325 per adult and 
$47.50 and $162.50 per child in 2014 and 2015, respectively; as well as a maximum 
of $285 and $975. Indeed, the rise of the quantity to pay is highly noticeable, as a 
result of a mechanism to encourage progressive enrolment to the marketplaces. 
In any case, there is a cap on the SRP annual amount, determined by the 
national average yearly premium for a Bronze level health plan available through the 
Marketplace. This limit is quite coherent with the goal of the penalty, as the 
individual can choose between either pay the fine and get nothing, or buy a bronze 
plan for the same price and at least have a basic insurance. Therefore, the SRP can be 
seen as an incentive for individuals to insure themselves, and not as a punitive fine. 
Actually, if the fine had not that cap, and could be even higher than the Bronze plan, 
then the most reasonable manoeuvre by the affected would be to buy such Bronze 
plan in order to avoid paying the SRP in the first place. 
Health Coverage Exemptions 
Separately, the ACA also provides some exemptions, gathered in title 26 USC, 
§5000A(e). These include individuals who cannot afford coverage, taxpayers with 
income below filing threshold, members of Indian tribes, individuals who went 
without coverage for less than three consecutive months a year (the so called short 
coverage gap) or individuals who can prove hardships to obtain coverage. 
Furthermore, there are some special groups which are explicitly exempted from the 
individual mandate, such as certain noncitizens, incarcerated individuals or members 
of certain religious sects, among others.  
Concerning the aim of this essay, it is interesting to take a look at the 
aforementioned exemption granted to those individuals who cannot afford coverage. 
This exemption provides that when the individual’s annual SRP required for the 
months not covered exceeds 8% of their yearly household income, that individual is 
excused from paying the penalty. As seen in King v. Burwell, this exemption is only 
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applicable when considering the cost after the deduction of the subsidies, which 
reduces considerably the real number of people released from complying with the 
individual mandate, as will be seen in the next point. 
3.3 TAX CREDITS 
The third arrow of the Obamacare system is a series of so called “premium tax 
credits”, which subsidise the costs of insurance for those with low or moderate 
incomes (26 USC §36B(b)-(c)). It consists of a refundable tax credit that the eligible 
recipient can choose to benefit either as a monthly payment for the premiums via the 
known as Advance Payments of the Premium Tax Credit (hereinafter, the APTC) –
which are directly paid to the insurer, and have to be complemented, when necessary, 
with the individual’s payment of the remainder of the premium-, or as a direct refund 
to the taxpayer’s pocket at the end of the year –needless to say, when the amount of 
the tax credit is higher than the amount of any other tax liabilities of the taxpayer-. 
The beneficiary can also choose to have some of the APTC directly paid to the 
insurance company to lower the monthly premiums, and get the rest refunded when 
doing the tax return.  
In order to be eligible for the premium tax credit, the taxpayer must comply 
with different requirements, among which a fundamental one is to be insured through 
an Exchange –that is, one of the State or Federal marketplaces created by the ACA. 
Another essential condition is the household income range, which is between 100% 
and 400% of the federal poverty line. In this regard, the reference figures are the 
poverty guidelines12  -loosely referred to as the federal poverty line-, which vary 
depending on the number of members of the household. In 2016 the federal poverty 
line was $11,880 for a household with one member, $16,020 with two, $20,160 with 
                                                          
12 The poverty guidelines are issued on an annual basis by the US Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). They are a simplification of the poverty thresholds, and used for administrative 
purposes, such as determining financial eligibility for a premium tax credit. The poverty guidelines can 
be consulted in the following link: https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines. 
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three, and so on (see Figure 3). By way of example, a family of four members would 
be eligible to get a tax credit if it had an income of between $24,300 and $97,200.  
 
Figure 3. 2016 US Poverty Guidelines.  
Source: US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
The APTC that an eligible individual and their family can receive depends on 
three variables: the location, the household income and the household size. According 
to these inputs, the amount of the credit13 is based on a sliding scale. That means that, 
for a certain location and a fixed number of family members, the credit increases in a 
linear manner –and needless to say, in an inverse proportion to their income. 
Therefore, keeping the other variables constant (location and household size), the 
more income a household earns, the less tax credit it receives to help cover the 
insurance costs. 
To be more precise, the premium contribution that an individual is due to pay 
for the insurance is limited to a percentage of their income for each income level, 
according to the proportions set by law (see Figure 4); and the remaining cost of the 
insurance is subsidised. However, there is a limit to the extent of the subsidy: the tax 
credit is tied to the cost of the second cheapest silver plan available. Consequently, if 
                                                          
13 The Internal Revenue Service also provides an online estimator where individuals can anonymously 
know the amount of premium tax credit they are entitled to receive: 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/estimator/premiumtaxcreditchange/.  
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the household enrols a more expensive coverage (up from another more expensive 
silver plan), then they will assume any additional amount of the costs. Conversely, if 
the household opts for a cheaper plan, such as the bronze, then their share of the 
premium will also be less. 
 
Figure 4. Premium contribution by household depending on their income.  
Source: USC 26 §36B(b)(3)(A)(i). 
It is important to observe that only incomes up from 250% of the federal 
poverty line have to contribute more than 8% of their income in health care plans 
expense. It has significant implications when taking into account the exemption of the 
individual mandate based on individuals who cannot afford coverage, as the 
requirement to apply such dispensation is that the health coverage be above 8% of 
their income. It can be proved hence that the Obamacare regulation wants to make 
sure that low income families have access to health care –or at least, that they cannot 
allege that it is unaffordable. 
Furthermore, the ACA also provides some extra subsidies for the cost-sharing 
expenses, such as deductibles and co-payments; but only for people enrolled in a 
Silver plan. It is clear that the regulation aims at incentivising the purchase of Silver 
health insurance, as they offer a higher premium than the Bronze plans, but with 
much more moderate extra costs when in need of coverage. Thus, the goal of the 
ACA is to extend health coverage but with a higher standard than the simple Bronze 
category, where the lowest premiums are compensated by the highest costs when 
people use the care coverage. As a matter of fact, Bonze plans are only profitable for 
those who usually use few medical services and simply want to be spared the large 
costs of really serious sicknesses or injuries.  
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3.4 OTHER ELEMENTS OF OBAMACARE 
Finally, another decisive provision of the ACA is the creation of the Health 
Insurance Marketplaces, commonly known as the Exchanges. They are platforms 
where individuals can get information about the health insurance options available 
and compare between them, in order to choose a plan and enrol it also through the 
Exchange platform. The Exchanges also inform about subsidies, as well as the cost-
sharing schemes the plans include.  
The aim of these Exchanges is to encourage competition among insurers, and 
facilitate informed access to coverage for individuals. That is why they are easily 
accessible, not only through websites, but also call centres and personalised 
assistance. There is a federal marketplace run by the federal government, but States 
can also create and run their own exchanges.  
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4 RESEARCH THROUGH THE EXCHANGES AND AETNA 
Once explained the main characteristics of Obamacare, the dissertation 
proceeds to put into practice these elements by means of some research through the 
Exchanges and the private market. The final aim of this work is to decipher why big 
health insurers are leaving the Exchanges, and in order to do so it will focus on one 
specific insurance company –Aetna. In the summer of 2016, Aetna pulled back from 
most of the Exchanges, and currently it is only available through the Marketplaces of 
four States: Delaware, Iowa, Nebraska and Virginia14. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
As already seen, Obamacare restricts the variables capable of affecting 
premiums (for a same level of coverage) to four: household size, location, age and 
tobacco use. Therefore, this research undertakes a comparison between the costs of 
health care for four different groups of individuals, divided according to their age and 
tobacco use. Concerning the other variables, the household size is always fixed to 
only one member, in order to simplify the study and its calculations; and the location 
is set in two different States: one where Aetna is still part of the Exchange (Delaware), 
and another where Aetna is not into the Exchange (Massachusetts). 
On the other hand, another variable which is important to be taken into 
account is the household income. Despite not affecting directly the price of the 
premium, the income is important when considering both the individual’s spending 
choices and the subsidies they can get in order to lower the cost of buying insurance. 
The research has set the income of each of the four individuals to $30,000, which is 
252.52% of the poverty level for a household of one member. 
Concerning the sources, it must be taken into account that unfortunately the 
Marketplaces are inaccessible without identification (and after passing a thorough ID 
                                                          
14 Aetna webpage: https://www.aetna.com/individuals-families/health-insurance-exchange.html. 
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check). Therefore, the only sources available have been the Aetna website concerning 
purchase of private health plans, and the Health Insurance Marketplace Calculator 
provided by the Kaiser Family Foundation 15 . This Calculator has two important 
limitations, as it only provides prices of the Bronze and Silver plans, and it does not 
take into account the tobacco use factor. However, the two plans are precisely the two 
most relevant categories for the purpose of this dissertation, as the Bronze is crucial 
when considering the amount of the fine for non-compliance with the individual 
mandate, and the second cheapest Silver plan sets the amount of the maximum 
proportion of subsidies an individual can get.  
The four fictional individuals who apply for insurance in the Exchanges in this 
research are: Billy (25 non-smoker), William (60 non-smoker), Danny (25 smoker), 
and Daniel (60 smoker). The research will focus firstly on their incentive to buy 
insurance in order to avoid paying the individual mandate, and it will proceed to 
analyse other important aspects, such as the range of menus available and the effect 
of the subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The Kaiser Family Foundation Health Insurance Marketplace Calculator can be accessed online 
through the following link: http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/  
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4.2 DATA OBTAINED ON THE RESEARCH 
Delaware (19904, Kent County, Dover, DE) 
Delaware 
Exchange (estimation through the Calculator)16 Aetna (into the Exchange) 
Bronze Silver 
Bronze Silver Gold 
Top 
Gold 
Premium 
Premium 
after 
subsidies 
Premium 
Premium 
after 
subsidies 
N
o
n
 
sm
o
k
er
s 
Billy, 25 
years 
285.67 
160 
333 207 285.73 325.35 421.76 435.33 
William, 
60 years 772.33 80 
899 207 772.38 879.49 1,140.09 1,176.77 
S
m
o
k
er
s 
Danny, 25 
years No data No data 
No data No data 314.30 357.89 463.94 478.86 
Daniel, 60 
years 
No data No data No data No data 849.62 967.44 1,254.10 1,294.45 
Figure 5. Premiums offered in the Exchange and the Aetna private shop in Delaware (amounts in $). 
Sources: Kaiser Family Foundation and Aetna. 
Massachusetts (02130, Suffolk County, Jamaica Plain, MA) 
Massachusetts 
Exchange (estimation through the Calculator) Aetna (out of the Exchange) 
Bronze 
 
Silver 
Bronze Silver Gold 
Top 
Platinum 
Premium 
Premium 
after 
subsidies 
Premium 
Premium 
after 
subsidies 
Billy and 
Danny, 25 
years17 
174.17 172 210 207 
214.81 
or 
221.22 
229.19 295.82 593.53 
William and 
Daniel, 60 years 
348.17 136 419 207 
429.44 
or 
442.25 
458.19 591.40 1,186.56 
Figure 6. Premiums offered in the Exchange and the Aetna private shop in Delaware (amounts in $).  
Sources: Kaiser Family Foundation and Aetna. 
                                                          
16 Observation: in this case, Aetna is part of the Exchange, so actually the prices of both the Exchange 
and the Aetna private market should be the same. However, the premiums of the Exchange are 
estimated through the KFF Calculator, and therefore have a certain margin of error. Actually, the 
margin of error is relatively small, as can be assessed by comparing the prices of the bronze and silver 
plans of both markets. 
17 In Massachusetts, the ratio applicable to tobacco use is set by law to 1:1, which means that there can 
be no discrimination on prices based on that variable. 
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US average 
US average 
Exchange (estimation through the Calculator) 
Bronze 
 
Silver 
Premium 
Premium after 
subsidies 
Premium 
Premium after 
subsidies 
Billy and Danny, 25 years 229,25 153 283 207 
William and Daniel, 60 years 618,08 60 766 207 
Figure 7. Premiums offered in the Exchange, US average (amounts in $).  
Sources: Kaiser Family Foundation and Aetna. 
4.3 STUDY OF THE EXCHANGES THROUGH THE DATA OBTAINED 
The individual mandate: coverage or fine? 
The first step in this study is to consider the incentives of each individual to 
join the Exchange and get coverage, from an economical point of view. In order to do 
so, it is essential to reckon the amount of the Individual Shared Responsibility (ISR), 
that is to say, the fine that an individual is due to pay if they do not comply with the 
individual mandate –providing that they are not exempted. 
As already explained, the ISR is the higher amount of either the 2.5% of 
household income above the tax return filing threshold, or the flat dollar amount per 
person. In any case, the cap for the ISR is the premium of the Bronze plan of the 
Marketplace. Taking into account all these considerations, Figure 8 proceeds to 
determine the ISR for all the four individuals, taking into account that the tobacco use 
is not relevant here.  
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Income excess 
amount 
Annual income $30,000.00 
Tax return filing 
threshold for singles 
under 65 
$10,350.00 
Annual income above 
the tax return filing 
threshold 
$19,650.00 
2.5% of total income 
excess amount 
$491.25 
Flat dollar amount $695.00 
Annual penalty amount (the higher of excess 
income amount or flat dollar amount) 
$695 
Monthly penalty amount $57.92 
Figure 8. Individual Shared Responsibility of Billy and Danny. 
It is noticeable that the penalty is far smaller than the premium of the Bronze 
plan. Indeed, if the ISR was higher than the bronze premium, then it would be capped 
by it and its amount would be the amount of that premium. However, in the case of 
our study, it is clear that the cap does not apply, and therefore the monthly penalty 
amount, for any of the four individuals, is the same: $57.92. At first glance, the 
decision of any of the individuals will be not to join any insurance plan and simply 
pay the monthly penalty. Nevertheless, there are other factors that may influence to 
their choice, as whether they feel or actually are more or less healthy, and 
consequently, less or more inclined to buy insurance anyway.  
It is necessary to consider an annual income far higher, of $100,000, for a 
single person to have an ISR capped by the bronze premium, and only in certain 
Marketplaces. In this case, the ISR would be $186.77 (see Figure 9), which would be 
higher than the bronze plan in the Massachusetts Exchange (where it costs $174.17), 
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and therefore a rational individual would prefer buying insurance. However, it would 
not be higher than the bronze premium in the Delaware Exchange (where it costs 
$285,67, as the income range is not eligible for subsidies), or even the US average 
bronze premium, which is $229 (see Figure 7). As a result, it can be concluded that 
for a single person the influence of the individual mandate is very small, only 
applicable for relatively high annual incomes.  
Single person 
(25 years old) 
Income excess 
amount 
Annual income $100,000.00 
Tax return filing 
threshold for singles 
under 65 
$10,350.00 
Annual income above 
the tax return filing 
threshold 
$89,650.00 
2.5% of total income 
excess amount 
$2,241.25 
Flat dollar amount $695.00 
Annual penalty amount (the higher of excess 
income amount or flat dollar amount) 
$2,241.25 
Monthly penalty amount $186.77 
Figure 9. Individual Shared Responsibility of a single person with an annual income of $100,000. 
Despite the conclusion reached, the research will proceed to consider the four 
individuals as single, as it is a simplification useful when studying the following 
aspects of Obamacare. 
The range of menus available 
The second important aspect to consider in this research is the variety of 
different options or menus available in the market for each individual. As already 
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seen, the diversity of menus on offer is a way of indirectly assign the appropriate 
health plan to each individual, according to their risk profile. This way, low risk 
individuals will be attracted to a low cost bronze plan, and higher risk individuals will 
be inclined to buy silver or gold plans, depending on their risk level and their income. 
It is an interest way to avoid direct discrimination from the insurer, according to the 
risk level of each customer, as it is illegal. Instead, it is the own customer who self-
allocate themselves in the plan that is more appropriate to their risk profile. 
In this sense, the broader the range of premiums, the better. This can be 
assessed by the difference between the cheapest and the most expensive plan, as it 
shows the variety of expense options available for any individual. As can be observed 
in Figures 10 and 11, the difference between the bronze and the top gold plans is 
quite important. As a matter of fact, there are two tendencies that should be 
highlighted: on the one hand, the range is wider when the customer is older; and on 
the other hand, the range is wider when Aetna is out of the Marketplace. The first 
observation is the result of the stronger subsidies that receive elders, which help to 
lower considerably the premium of the bronze and silver plans; and the higher risk 
that they have to need coverage, which increases the average cost, especially if 
considering the real cost charged by the insurer, once it receives both the money from 
the customer’s pocket and from the subsidies. 
 
Figure 10. Menus available for Billy and William in Delaware (in blue, premiums without subsidies, 
in red premiums after subsidies). 
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Figure 11. Menus available for Billy and William in Massachusetts (in blue, premiums without 
subsidies, in red premiums after subsidies). 
Concerning the larger difference of premium costs when Aetna is out of the 
Exchange, it can be the effect of the less strict regulations concerning premiums rates 
on the private market. In this regard, it is noticeable that the premiums of the different 
categories (bronze, silver and even gold) are actually cheaper in Massachusetts for the 
elder (William), where Aetna is outside the Exchange; but the top gold plan is more 
expensive. That leads to a much broader range in Massachusetts, especially if the 
subsidies are not taken into account (see Figure 12). It could be one of the reasons 
why Aetna has pulled out of most of the Exchanges, as they can charge more freely, 
though there is an important drawback: in the private market, individuals cannot 
benefit from the tax credits, which have an important weight when considering lower 
income households. 
State Risk profile  
(according to age) 
Premium range18 
Delaware Billy, 25 $149.60 
William, 60 $404.39 
Massachusetts  Billy, 25 $378.72 
William, 60 $757.12 
Figure 12. Premium ranges available in the private market for each individual according to age. 
                                                          
18 The premium range is the difference between the most expensive and the cheapest plans in each 
private market, without considering subsidies. For example, in Delaware, the premium range for Billy 
is the difference between the premiums of the top gold plan ($435.33) and the bronze ($285.73). 
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The subsidies 
Last but not least, it is important to analyse the effect of the subsidies on the 
actual cost of the plan for the individual. The essential goal of the subsidies is to 
foster cross-subsidisation of the cost of coverage between rich and poor citizens, but 
in a greater extent for the elder than the younger, as will be seen. 
Firstly, it is necessary to compute the amount of the premium applicable to the 
individuals of the research. To do so, the only relevant variables are their income and 
their household size, so they all are entitled to the same premium price. Their annual 
income of $30,000 is 252.52% the poverty line ($11,880 for a single-member family), 
so they should spend only up to the 8.28% of their income on health coverage. It 
means that, no matter the cost of the plan they buy, it will cost a maximum of $207 
(the 8.28% of $30,000, on a monthly basis). There is a limit though: this subsidised 
final cost is tied to the second cheapest silver plan available. 
The result of the tax credit system is that for any market price of the premium 
that the insurer charges according to the age of the customer (𝑝𝑎), there is a subsidy 
the amount of which will eventually also depend on the age of the customer (𝑠𝑎). The 
real cost for the customer (𝑐𝑎) is the subtraction of the subsidy to the market price of 
the premium: 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑠𝑎 = 𝑐𝑎. Taking into account that the market premiums for the 
elder are far higher than the ones for the younger (𝑝60 > 𝑝25), and that the cost for 
the customer is the same when their incomes are the same (𝑐60 = 𝑐25 ), then the 
subsidies of the elder are also higher than the ones of the younger (𝑠60 > 𝑠25). The 
amount of the subsidies is precisely the subtraction of the cost for the customer to the 
market price of the premium: 
𝑠25 = 𝑝25 − 𝑐25 = {
𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒:      333 − 207 = 126
𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑠: 210 − 207 = 3
 
𝑠60 = 𝑝60 − 𝑐60 = {
𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒:           899 − 207 = 692
𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑠: 419 − 207 = 212
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The result of this system of tax credits is a clear preference to subsidise the 
elder than the younger (see Figure 13). This favourable treatment of the elder is even 
more obvious when considering the bronze premiums after subsidies (see Figure 14). 
If an individual chooses a bronze plan, as it is cheaper than the benchmark plan (the 
second cheapest silver plan), the same amount of the subsidy applies to the bronze 
premium. For example, the $692 subsidy for William in Delaware applied to the 
bronze premium of $772.33 results in a final cost of $80.33; while the $126 subsidy 
for Billy in the same State, applied to his bronze premium of $285.67, results in a 
cost of $159.67 (see Figure 5). This is a highly curious outcome, because despite 
originally having a far higher bronze premium ($772.33 compared with $285.67), the 
elder ends up paying a plan for half the price of that of the younger ($80 compared 
with $160). 
 
Figure 13. Silver Premiums in each Exchange (in blue, premiums without subsidies, in red, premiums 
after subsidies). 
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Figure 14. Bronze Premiums in each Exchange (in blue, premiums without subsidies, in red, premiums 
after subsidies). 
Another important observation is that, as the real cost for the consumer is the 
same when the income is the same, there is a kind of compensation between States. 
That is to say, the States where the premiums are higher receive more subsidies by 
individual of the same age and income, as is the case of Delaware compared to 
Massachusetts (see Figures 13 and 14). 
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5 CONCLUSION. WHY ARE SOME INSURANCE 
COMPANIES LEAVING THE EXCHANGES? 
Advantages of the Exchanges 
The research has clarified some aspects of the ACA, but at the same time it 
has posed some questions. On the one hand, it has proven the significant role of the 
subsidies as a means to redistribute costs and help low income households, focusing 
especially on the elder. It has also highlighted the fact that any person on any State 
will have to pay the same silver coverage, if eligible for tax credits and provided that 
they have the same income and household size.  
Indeed, the essential element that benefits both insurers and customers is the 
subsidy. The subsidy comes from the federal pocket (and therefore, it comes from the 
taxpayers’ contribution), and lets the insurer keep high premiums, while the insured 
benefits from a at times considerable deduction. Thanks to this mechanism, the 
Obamacare ensures access to coverage for the more vulnerable, especially the elder. 
But in order to keep it, it is essential that the government guarantee an important part 
of the budget to subsidies –which is currently under threat, under the new presidency 
of Trump. 
A decisive drawback for the insurers that leave the Exchanges is that their 
customers are not entitled to get tax credits. Taking into account the generous 
subsidies that the marketplaces offer, especially to the poorer and the elder, it can be 
a crucial inconvenience for many clients. But maybe the aim of the insurers is 
precisely to avoid this kind of customers, as they tend to be the less healthy. 
Disadvantages of the Exchanges 
On the other hand, the study has proven that the individual mandate has 
practically no influence when considering a household of only one individual. The 
research has been limited by the simplification pursued in this regard, and it could be 
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interesting for any other future research to proceed with the comparison of the effect 
of the individual mandate on households of other sizes. 
Concerning the reason why private insurers such as Aetna are leaving the 
Marketplaces, the main reason probably is the strict regulation imposed by 
Obamacare. However, it is not clear the extent to which this argument is decisive. In 
the first place, the regulation of prices into the Exchanges may constraint the capacity 
of the insurance companies to raise premiums, but the research has proven that the 
prices are not much higher outside the Exchange.  
An important uncontested advantage of being out of the Exchange is the wider 
range of premiums between the cheapest and the most expensive menus. It may be 
one of the factors that influence on the companies who leave, as it allows them a 
broader offer of choices for the potential customers to self-allocate themselves 
according to their risk profile. This helps the company to reach a larger amount of 
people, and to distribute them more appropriately. Nevertheless, the research has 
shown that the range of menus available inside the Marketplaces is actually quite 
broad, so this factor cannot be the only one. 
The main reason given by the insurance companies for leaving is basically 
that they incur in important losses. These losses can be the result of not attracting 
enough young and healthy individuals, which may in turn be due to the weak effect of 
the individual mandate. This feeble influence of the mandate is the consequence of 
either a too low fine, or a too high bronze premium. Therefore, a reasonable solution 
could be either to raise the amount of the fine from the current 2.5% of income, or to 
subsidise more strongly the younger.  
Final conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis proposes to increase the penalty for non-compliance 
with the individual mandate, and at the same time, to readjust the distribution of the 
subsidies more proportionally between the younger and the elder. The current system 
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prioritises the elder, which is socially sensible. However, from an economic point of 
view, it is also important to incentivise the younger to enter the Exchanges, as it is the 
only way to compensate the expenses of the elder for the insurer. Furthermore, as the 
new regulation does not allow insurers to discriminate on no other basis than age or 
tobacco use, it is relevant that the insurers can get some more leverage when fixing 
prices, which could imply widening the current 3:1 rate for premium variation 
according to the age. 
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6 ABBREVIATIONS 
ACA   Affordable Care Act (also referred to as Obamacare) 
APTC   Advanced Payments of the Premium Tax Credit 
KFF   Kaiser Family Foundation 
SRP   Shared Responsibility Payment  
Obamacare  Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
US(A)   United States (of America) 
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8 ANNEX I. INSURANCE PLANS AVAILABLE ON AETNA 
PRIVATE MARKET 
8.1 DELAWARE 
Billy 
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Danny 
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8.2 MASSACHUSETTS 
Billy and Danny 
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William and Daniel 
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